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Abstract 
 
Managerial succession decisions constitute crucial events for the company, as they can generate 
important organizational changes that affect the shareholders’ wealth, and at the same time, en-
tail important conflicts of interests between the managers and the shareholders. Our study of the 
market reactions to managerial turnover announcements in the Spanish market, reveal that these 
decisions have a positive effect on the shareholders’ wealth. These wealth effects are especially in-
tense in the case of outsider successions and when the company preturnover performance has 
been poor. These findings suggest that managerial turnover is a restructuring decision that is most 
welcome under conditions of low performance. These results are reinforced by the existence of a 
negative relationship between the turnover wealth effects and the firm's preturnover performance. 
Our results also have implications regarding the effectiveness of the Spanish corporate gover-
nance system, suggesting that the Board's outsiders and the institutional shareholders play a ma-
jor monitoring role in the managerial succession processes. The Board outsiders and the institu-
tional shareholders influence the succession process protecting the shareholders’ interests against 
particular professional interests of the managers. We have also found evidences of the existence of 
entrenchment effects linked to managerial stock ownership. Finally, consistently with our event 
study results, we have found evidences of a positive effect of outside succession on the market's 
reaction to managerial turnover, in the case of a poor presuccession performance context. We 
have obtained no evidence about any effect from outside succession in good performing compa-
nies or inside succession in any company independently of its previous performance. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
EO succession consequences on the shareholders’ wealth and the implication of the Board of directors 
and other control mechanisms in this event is a major question in the corporate governance literature. In 
this study we analyse the wealth effects linked to managerial succession events and the implication of 
the corporate governance system in the outcomes of this event. 
 
 There is not a consensus about the effects of managerial turnover on firm's performance and the sharehold-
ers’ wealth. There are marked differences in the way different authors see managerial turnover. Pfeffer and Salancik, 
(1978) consider managerial turnover as a mean to adapt the firm to the changing requirements of the environment. 
Managerial succession is an occasion to replace decision makers with others whose capabilities are more suitable to 
solve critical problems posed by the firm's environment. The better alignment between the firm and its environment 
has therefore a positive effect on the shareholders wealth. On the other hand, other authors consider managerial 
turnover as a disruptive event that brakes organisational routines, and therefore, affects negatively the firm's per-
formance (Grusky, 1963). A third view considers that managerial succession has a negligible effect on firm's per-
formance, as the firm's profitability is a function of organisational processes and external variables that are outside 
the control of the manager (Gamson and Scotch, 1964). 
 
_____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via email. 
C 
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 In an attempt to analyse the effects of managerial turnover decisions on organisational outcomes, we study 
the market's reaction to these events. Any significant reaction would imply that managerial turnover brings about a 
change in the estimated amount of cash flows generated in the future by the company. The market reactions will 
therefore inform us about the relevance of managerial turnover. 
 
 Given that managerial succession decisions are taken by the Board of Directors, the analysis of its derived 
market reactions can provide evidence on the control activity performed by the Board, and in general, by all the 
monitoring mechanisms that form the corporate governance system in the Spanish economy. The study of the super-
visory activity in managerial turnover decisions is specially relevant, given that substituting a top manager is a 
source of interest conflicts between the managers and the shareholders. If the set of control mechanisms in place are 
acting in the shareholders’ best interest, the proper successor will be selected, and turnover will bring an improve-
ment in the suitability of the manager for the demands of his/her roles. In this way, the study of the relationship be-
tween the market reactions to managerial turnover and the different control mechanisms that can affect the succes-
sion decision, will show the intensity of shareholders’ interest protection by the corporate governance system. 
Therefore this study tries to extend corporate governance research, mainly developed in the Anglo-Saxon economic 
context, to the Spanish economy, in which shareholders’ interests protection is internally exerted by the Board of di-
rectors and the stock ownership concentration. 
 
 The remaining sections of this paper are organised as follows. Section two discusses the determinants of 
managerial turnover wealth effects and resumes the hypothesis of the study. Section three describes the variables 
and the models used to test these hypothesis. Section four describes the data set. Section five presents our main em-
pirical results and section six concludes. 
 
2. Determinants Of The Market's Reaction To Managerial Succession 
 
 The substitution and selection of new managers is a significant matter since the future outcomes of the firm, 
and therefore the shareholders’ wealth, could greatly depend on the suitability of the succession decision. Under the 
"common-sense" theoretical point of view the manager has control on organisational outcomes. Thus, managerial 
turnover provides an opportunity to improve the leader's capabilities to run the firm. If chosen adequately, the new 
selected manager can avoid at least some of the mistakes made his/her predecessor, improving in this way the per-
formance of the organisation. To the extent that the investor's community perceives this improvement in expected 
firm's cash flows after a managerial succession event, there will be a positive market reaction around managerial 
turnover announcement. Under this theoretical point of view, we expect that managerial turnover announcements 
will generate positive abnormal market returns. 
 
 Conducting the managerial succession process is one of the Board of Directors' duties. Managerial succes-
sion provides therefore evidence of whether the Board and alternative internal control mechanisms, that are preva-
lent in the Spanish governance system, are acting on the shareholders’ best interest. If the managerial succession de-
cisions taken by the Board of Directors are consistent with the shareholders’ value maximization, the shareholders’ 
wealth will increase after the turnover announcement. Although the Board is the last mechanism responsible for the 
succession decisions, the rest of control mechanisms in place can induce value enhancing Board's actions. Therefore, 
besides the Board's characteristics, other control mechanisms, in the Spanish case principally related to stock owner-
ship structure, are going to determine the market's reaction to managerial succession. 
 
2.1. Firm's Preturnover Performance 
 
 The firm's performance indicates, to a certain extent, the quality of managerial decisions. In that sense, 
when the firm is performing poorly it signs the need for a change in its strategies to recover profitability. On the 
contrary, when the firm profitability is high enough to fairly compensate the shareholders for their financing and risk 
bearing functions, there is an incentive for continuity and stability in the strategies and policies of the company. 
 
 Managerial succession brings about important organisational changes. Different authors have observed the 
existence of restructuring processes promoted by managerial succession. Weisbach (1995) found a higher probabil-
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ity of divesting non profitable acquisitions after managerial turnover. In line with this finding, Denis and Denis 
(1995) have found evidence that non routine managerial turnover is followed by a downsizing process affecting the 
firm's assets and labour force. The managerial turnover provides an opportunity to correct previous managerial non 
enhancing decisions. According to that, Denis and Denis (1995), Guest (1962) and Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) 
found evidences of a positive effect on the firm's performance derived from managerial turnover. 
 
 If managerial turnover generates organisational changes, managerial succession is going to be better valued 
by the shareholders when organisational changes is necessary, that is when the firm's performance is low. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Turn around hypothesis: The lower the firm's preturnover performance the higher the stock market reaction to 
managerial succession. 
 
2.2. The effect of the governance structure on managerial turnover 
 
 The effect of managerial turnover on the firm's performance depends not only on the suitability of remo-
ving the present manager, but on the selection of a successor that fits to the firm's needs. To this respect, the market 
reaction to managerial turnover depends on the confidence that the investors community has on the capability of the 
Board of directors to select a good successor. To the extent that the governance structure guarantees that the Board 
of directors is able to successfully represent the shareholders’ interests, the Board's decisions, including managerial 
turnover, are going to be favourably assessed by the investors. In that sense, the presence of Board outsiders, the 
alignment effect linked to managerial stock ownership and the presence of large independent shareholders, favour 
the governance activity exerted by the Board, and therefore, can affect the market's reaction to managerial turnover. 
 
2.2.1. The Board's composition 
 
 Managerial turnover constitute a source of organisational change. Thus, a change in the CEO position en-
tails an important degree of uncertainty for all the members in the managerial team, and in general, for all the 
Board's directors. The intensity of the risk perceived by the directors will depend partially on their insider or out-
sider origin. 
 
 The appointment of outsider managers hinders the insider manager's professional career. Firstly, a new out-
sider's appointment implies the loss of a job opportunity for the insider managers. Secondly, the outsiders generate 
prospects of organisational change that threatens the insider's jobs. A new outsider manager can consider insider 
managers unsuitable for undertaking important management changes because of organisational inertia and for their 
responsibility in past managerial actions that prevent them to correct past decisions. In that case, the outsider will 
probably promote changes in the managerial staff, bringing even with him members of his/her old managerial team, 
to help with the task of reorganising the company. 
 
 The appointment of an outsider can therefore generate an intense turnover in the managerial team being a 
clear hazard for the insider’s professional career. According to that, Helmich and Brown (1972), Boeker (1992) and 
Kesner and Dalton (1994) observed more personnel turnover in the managerial second tier when the top executive is 
substituted by an outsider than when the substitute is an insider. 
 
 Managers, and in general all the insiders of the Board, have therefore particular interests to defend in any 
managerial succession process. The defence of the insider's professional interests imply their preference for insider 
successors. According to this, Borockhovich et al. (1996) found evidences of a negative influence of the insiders of 
the Board on the probability of an outsider top manager appointment. This restriction imposed by the insiders to the 
successor's origin can harm the shareholders' interests leading to a sub optimal CEO selection. This conflict of inter-
ests between the insiders of the Board and the shareholders becomes especially severe in disciplinary managerial 
turnover decisions, where a drastic organisational change is necessary.  
 
 Given that managerial succession is a source of conflicts between the insiders of the Board and the share-
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holders, if the Board of Directors is dominated by insiders, any managerial succession process will probably tend to 
serve to the manager's interests instead of the shareholders’. The alleviation of this agency conflict requires that the 
shareholders’ interests are sufficiently represented in a Board of directors that is not dominated by the managers. 
Therefore, as noted by Fama and Jensen (1983), it is necessary to include outside independent Board Directors to 
guarantee the representation of the shareholders’ interests in any decision that, as in the case of managerial succes-
sion, generates an agency conflict between the managers and the shareholders. Therefore, the shareholders would 
react more favourably to any managerial turnover decision taken by a board of directors in which the owner's inter-
ests are conveniently represented by outside directors. Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis about the 
control activity by Board's outsiders. 
 
Outsiders' control Hypothesis: The proportion of outside Board Directors have a positive influence on the market's 
reaction to managerial turnover. 
 
2.2.2. Managerial stock ownership 
 
 The managerial stock ownership generates alignment and entrenchment effects that affects managerial in-
centives to act in the shareholders' interest. On the one hand, in the case of a single manager-owner there are no 
agency problems as the manager experiments directly all the negative effects of her/his non value maximising ac-
tions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to that, the negative effects of managerial opportunistic behaviour on 
her/his own wealth invested in the company, contributes to the alignment of managerial and shareholders’ interests. 
Thus, managerial stock ownership incentives value enhancing activities in the firm.  
 
 Several studies corroborate the existence of an alignment effect linked to the managerial stock ownership. 
In this sense, Hanson and Song (2000) reported a positive relationship between the shareholders’ gains from divesti-
tures and managerial stock ownership. The study of abnormal stock market returns resulting from company mergers 
in the US market done by Lewellen et al. (1985)
i
 suggests also the existence of an incentive effect linked to manage-
rial stock ownership. This alignment of interests is confirmed by Buchhotlz and Ribbens (1994) who show the exis-
tence of a negative relationship between managerial stock ownership and the intensity of managerial resistance to 
takeover attempts. In this way, managerial stock ownership protects shareholders from the losses coming from 
managerial resistance to takeovers
ii
. Similar alignment effects are confirmed by Curcio (1994), who found in the UK 
market the existence of a positive relationship between managerial stock ownership and productivity growth. 
 
 Considering this alignment effect, any managerial succession decision will be aimed to create value for the 
shareholders when the insiders of the Board have a significant ownership stake in the firm. Therefore, managerial 
stock ownership should have a positive effect of market's reaction to managerial succession. 
 
 However, managerial stock ownership could have the opposite effects if it is high enough to insulate man-
agers from any internal or external control. If the amount of vote rights controlled by the managerial team is large 
enough, the managers could indulge in opportunistic behaviour without being disciplined by the markets or the rest 
of the shareholders. 
 
 Several studies corroborate the existence of an entrenchment effect liked to managerial stock ownership. 
Denis et al. (1997) found in the US market a negative influence of the managerial stock ownership on the discipli-
nary role of the Board of directors. According to that resistance of the managers to the Board's control, Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1980) observed a positive relationship between managerial stock ownership and manager's tenure.  
 
 If there is an entrenchment effect linked to managerial stock ownership, managerial turnover decisions 
taken by a Board dominated by entrenched managers could easily serve to their private interests. In this case, the 
shareholders will be reluctant about managerial succession processes. Therefore, the manager's stock stake could 
reasonably have a negative influence on the market's reaction to a managerial succession event. 
 
 Taking into account the double and opposite influence of managerial stock ownership on the market's reac-
tion to managerial succession two different hypothesis are posed: 
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 Alignment Hypothesis: Managerial stock ownership has a positive influence on market's reaction to mana-
gerial turnover. 
 Entrenchment Hypothesis: Managerial stock ownership has a negative influence on market's reaction to 
managerial turnover. 
 
2.2.3. The large shareholders’ monitoring activity 
 
 Performing a monitoring activity by small shareholders is economically inefficient. Monitoring sharehold-
ers incur in direct monitoring costs, but receive only benefits from this activity in proportion to their shares stake. 
According to that, direct monitoring costs are higher than the direct profits received by the small shareholder. Only 
the large shareholders are able to make a profit from managerial monitoring activities. Moreover, the large share-
holders present important incentives to control managerial actions, as they bear a high proportion of the negative 
consequences of non value maximising actions. Thus, the presence on large shareholders tend to increase the inten-
sity of direct supervision on managerial actions. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
 
 Different authors have corroborated the supervisory activity performed by large shareholders. Franks et al. 
(1997), Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasany, (1995) confirm the positive influence of large share-
holders on managerial turnover in underperforming firms. In the same way, there are evidences of a higher modera-
tion in managerial remuneration in presence of large shareholders (Dyl, 1988; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). 
 
 The presence of large shareholders supervising managerial actions motivate them to act in the interest of 
the shareholders. Therefore, in the event of a managerial substitution, large shareholders induce the selection of a 
successor with the best prospects of value creation for shareholders.  According to that, we propose the following 
hypothesis about the supervisory role of large shareholders. 
 
Large shareholders supervision: The large shareholdings have a positive influence on market reactions to manage-
rial turnover. 
 
2.3. The relevance of successor's origin 
 
 The previous organisational membership of the successor appointed have an impact on the expected mana-
gerial behaviour, and therefore, is likely to affect the shareholders’ expectations respecting the future of the com-
pany. Successor's outside/inside origin conveys information about the propensity of the new manager to implement 
changes in the strategies of the company. The insiders' responsibility in past managerial decisions in the firm 
(Wiersema, 1992) and the similarity in problem identification and problem solving in a cohesive group of insiders 
(Pfeffer, 1985) make inside successors less likely to induce an intense reorientation in the firm's strategies. On the 
contrary, outside successors are seen as portents of major changes in the company (Guest, 1962; Helmich and 
Brown, 1972). According to that, different authors have found evidences of more intense organisational changes 
when the successor is an outsider than in the case when is an insider (Boeker, 1992; Helmich, 1974; Helmich and 
Brown, 1972; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Wiersema, 1992). 
 
 The change in strategic direction is likely to be welcome by the shareholders when the company presucces-
sion performance has been poor. However, when the firm's performance has been good, the shareholders are going 
to be suspicious about any major organisational change. According to that, the expected market reaction to manage-
rial succession depends both in the origin of the successor and in the perceived need for organisational change. Out-
sider successors are presumably most welcome in underperforming companies and insiders are preferred in good 
performing companies, generating in both cases positive market reactions. On the other hand outsiders can result ex-
cessively disruptive when the company has a good performance and the stability arising from a inside successor is 
not going to be welcome in underperforming companies. In both kinds of changes we expect a negative reaction 
from the market. 
 
 Therefore we propose the following hypothesis: 
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 Origin's relevance hypothesis: Outsider successors in underperforming companies and insider successors in 
high performing companies are going to generate positive market reactions, while outsider successors in 
high performing firms and insider successors in underperforming companies are likely to generate negative 
market reactions. 
 
3. Methodology And Variables 
 
 The main aim of our study is to analyze the market's reaction to managerial turnover events and the deter-
minants of this reaction. We measure the market reaction by calculating the firm's daily abnormal return around the 
event's day. The abnormal return measures the effect of new information released to the market by the turnover an-
nouncement on the investors expectations about the future cash flows generated by the firm. In order to analyze the 
determinants of the observed abnormal returns several OLS linear regression models are estimated, where the de-
pendant variable is the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of managerial turnover (CAR01). We 
accumulate abnormal returns around the event’s day, using the interval (0, +1) as our dependent variable. 
 
 To analyze the effect of preturnover performance on market's reaction to managerial turnover, we include 
in the model the firm's market performance in the 365-day period ending 21 days before the date of the turnover an-
nouncement (PERF). This firm's market performance measure has been also adjusted by the Madrid Stock Exchange 
Index return for the same period (ADJPERF). If, as discussed previously, managerial turnover is a way to bring 
about organizational change, the reaction to this event is going to be negatively correlated to firm's previous perfor-
mance. 
 
 To test the outsider's control hypothesis we include the percentage of Board outsiders (POUT). We consider 
outsiders all those Directors that are not present managers of the company and have not been in the past and that 
have not either family ties with any present or past manager of the company. If according to our hypothesis, the out-
siders provide the Board with independence and objectivity, necessary to keep the Board's decisions in line with 
shareholders’ interests, we expect a positive relationship between this variable and the dependent variable (CAR01). 
Following Weisbach (1988) we capture also the effect of the Board composition using a set of dummy variables that 
represent an outsider dominated Board (DOUT) a balanced Board (MIX) and an insider dominated Board (DINS), 
being these variables defined as follows: 
 
 Considering the supervisory 
and control activity performed by the 
Board's outsiders we expect that mar-
ket reactions will be the most positive 
when managerial turnover decisions 
are taken by an outsider dominated 
Board of Directors. We expect there-
fore a positive coefficient for the DOUT variable.  In order to analyze the possible existence of alignment and en-
trenchment effects linked to managerial stock ownership, the accumulated stock ownership of all Board insiders 
(INOWN) is included in the regression model. If the market considers that managerial stock ownership incentives 
value enhancing actions, we expect to obtain a positive relationship between managerial stock ownership (INOWN) 
and the dependent variable (CAR01). On the other hand, if the market considers that managerial stock ownership is 
a mean to isolate managers from external control, we expect to obtain a negative relationship between managerial 
stock ownership (INOWN) and the market's reaction to managerial turnover (CAR01). 
 
 To test if the large shareholders supervise managerial actions we include in the model the joint stock own-
ership of the three non executive largest shareholders (LARGE3). The large shareholders will take steps to avoid 
any wealth loss due to an inadequate managerial substitution decision. Therefore, we expect to obtain a positive rela-
tionship between the large shareholders’ stock ownership (LARGE3) and the market's reaction to managerial substi-
tution (CAR01). To analyze the possible differences in large shareholders' behavior depending on their nature we 
include in the model the joint stock ownership of financial institutions (BANKS), the joint stock ownership of non 
financial companies (NOFIN) and the joint stock ownership of institutional shareholders (FUNDS). If these large 
DOUT=1 If the proportion of outside Directors is 60% or higher 
DOUT=0 Otherwise 
MIX=1 If the proportion of outside Directors is the range of 40% to 60% 
MIX=0 Otherwise 
DINS=1 If the proportion of outside directors is under 40% 
DINS=0 Otherwise 
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shareholders play a supervisory role, we expect a positive relationship between these variables and the market's 
reaction to managerial turnover (CAR01). 
 
 The joint effect of the successor's origin and the perceived need of organizational change on the market's 
reaction to managerial turnover are tested by including in the model a set of dummy variables that identify several 
possible turnover processes. These variables are defined as follows: 
 
 
COUPLED=1 If the successor's origin matches the need for organizational change in the company. Insider origin/good  
preturnover performance and outsider origin/poor preturnover performance. 
COUPLED=0 If the successor's origin does not match the need for organizational change in the company. 
Outsider origin/good preturnover performance and insider origin/poor preturnover performance. 
 
 
OUT/POOR Equals 1 if the successor is an outsideriii and the company underperformed the market in the year period  
previous to managerial turnover and zero otherwise 
OUT/GOOD Equals 1 if the successor is an outsider and the company outperformed the market in the year period previous 
to managerial turnover and zero otherwise 
INS/POOR Equals 1 if the successor is an insider and the company underperformed the market in the year period previous 
to managerial turnover and zero otherwise 
INS/GOOD Equals 1 if the successor is an insider and the company outperformed the market in the year period previous to 
managerial turnover and zero otherwise 
 
 
 We expect that the market reaction is going to be higher when there is a good match between the successors 
origin and the perceived need for organizational change. That is, an outsider successor when low presucession per-
formance claims for organizational changes (OUT/POOR) and an insider successor when good presucession per-
formance claims for continuity (INS/GOOD). Thus, we expect to obtain positive coefficients for these two variables 
and for the variable (COUPLED) that represents this two situations when taking the value of one. In the other cases 
(OUT/GOOD) and (INS/POOR) we expect the market to react negatively, as the propensity of the successor to un-
dertake changes in the company does not match the need for organizational change. According to this, we expect to 
record a negative relationship between these variables and the dependent variable (CAR01). 
 
 The regression model finally estimated is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Sample And Database 
 
 The initial sample for our study is formed by 234 president and CEO changes that occur in the interval 
CAR01=+1*PERF +            2*POUT +             3* INOWN  +              4*LARGE3 +             5*COUPLED +    
ADJPERF DOUT 
Alternatively Alternatively 
DMIX 
DINS 
BANKS 
Alternatively 
FUNDS 
NOFIN 
OUT/POOR 
Alternatively 
OUT/GOOD 
INS/POOR 
INS/GOOD 
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1990-97 for a group of 155 companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. All the managerial turnover an-
nouncements have been collected by revising the Economic press. For a turnover decision to be included in the sam-
ple we have to be able to identify an announcement date in one of the main national economic journals, i.e. Expan-
sión, Gaceta de los Negocios or Cinco Días. Also, we restrict our sample to those companies for which no contami-
nating announcement was found around the managerial turnover announcement dates. We additionally required that 
stock ownership data, Board's and managerial team composition data were available. With this selection criteria the 
final database consists of 106 top manager turnover announcements. Table 1 shows the chronological distribution of 
managerial turnover announcements. 
 
 
Table 1: Chronological distribution of top manager's turnover announcements. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 
6 12 20 24 21 11 6 6 106 
 
 
 As it can be seen the main part of our sample is concentrated in the 1992-94 interval, which were years cha-
racterized by a turbulent economic environment and a general economic recession in the Spanish economy. Appar-
ently, the economic recession triggers the managerial turnover decision as a mean to correct the firm's low perfor-
mance. 
 
 To compute the wealth effects associated to managerial turnover announcements, market model parameters 
are estimated for a period from 200 to 20 days before the announcement date. To test the statistical significance of 
our results we use the parametric test described by Dodd and Warner (1983). The announcement date is the first day 
a mention of the managerial turnover appears in the press. The stock prices, dividends and subscription rights neces-
sary to estimate market model parameters and preturnover performance have been extracted from the Daily Bulletin 
of the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
 
 The composition of the board of directors has been extracted from the registers of the Spanish Stock Ex-
change Commission. We have compared this data with the composition of the Board showed at the firm's annual re-
port whenever we had this document. The composition of the managerial team, necessary to classify the directors in 
the category of insiders and outsiders have been consulted in different firm's and manager's directories, (Nueva Em-
presa, Dun's and Dicodi)
iv
. Finally, the various stock ownership variables used in this study have been extracted 
from the registers of the Spanish Stock Exchange Commission. The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in 
the empirical contrasts are shown in table 2. 
 
 
 The mean abnormal return (CAR01) resulting from a managerial turnover announcement is 0.70%. This 
suggests that the market assumes that the average succession decision is positive for the shareholders’ wealth. The 
preturnover performance in the year before managerial turnover is 4.70%, but when adjusted by the market perfor-
mance it results -1.01% which means that the mean company that suffers a managerial succession process underper-
formed the market in the year previous to the managerial change. This negative adjusted preturnover performance 
could indicate the disciplinary role of managerial turnover in the total sample
v
.  
 
 The mean proportion of outside Board directors is 65.64% which is similar to the 60.09% mean value regis-
tered in the US market by Barnhart et al. (1994). The ownership structure clearly differs from those recorded in stud-
ies conducted in Anglo-Saxon economies. The mean stock ownership of the three largest shareholders in our sample 
is 51.76% while the mean stock ownership by the five and twenty largest shareholders recorded by Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) for the US market is only 24.81% and 37.66% respectively. This clearly reveals the existence of a 
much higher stock ownership concentration in the Spanish market. The stock ownership of managers is much lower 
in our Spanish sample compared to Anglo-Saxon economies. We have recorded a mean 1.12% stock ownership 
compared to 11,7% recorded by Denis et al. (1997) in the US market and mean values in the UK market that ranged 
from 13,34% to 11,47% (Short and Keasey, 1998). This ownership pattern points to a continental-type corporate 
governance system based on internal control provided by a high stock ownership concentration. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
CAR01 0.70% 3.24% -9.00% 13.41% 106 
PERF 4.70% 64.96% -81.03% 392.08% 106 
ADJPERF -1.01% 58.12% -78.72% 372.13% 106 
POUT 65.64% 20.47% 0.00% 100.00% 106 
DOUT 0.7075 0.4571 0.0000 1.0000 106 
DMIX 0.1981 0.4005 0.0000 1.0000 106 
DINS 0.0943 0.2937 0.0000 1.0000 106 
PINS 1.12% 3.66% 0.00% 24.97% 106 
LARGE3 51.76% 31.57% 0.09% 92.78% 106 
BANK 10.04% 17.79% 0.00% 85.01% 106 
FUND 1.44% 9.26% 0.00% 90.08% 106 
NOFIN 38.59% 32.36% 0.00% 95.79% 106 
COUPLED 0.4811 0.5020 0.0000 1.0000 106 
OUT/POOR 0.2830 0.4526 0.0000 1.0000 106 
OUT/GOOD 0.2075 0.4075 0.0000 1.0000 106 
INS/POOR 0.3113 0.4652 0.0000 1.0000 106 
INS/GOOD 0.1981 0.4005 0.0000 1.0000 106 
 
 
 Regarding the type of successor, the sample is balanced, containing a 49% of outsider successors and a 
51% of inside successors. If we consider presuccession performance we observe that managerial changes are preva-
lent in underperforming companies. Around 60% of our sample is comprised by companies that were underperform-
ing the market while 40% correspond to firms that were outperforming the market. This points out to the discipli-
nary role of managerial turnover. 
 
5. Results 
 
 Table 3 shows the abnormal returns around the announcement of a change in the president or CEO position. 
For the whole sample we observe a positive market's reaction of 0.58% in the event's day and 0.7% in the interval 
(0;+1) being both statistically significant at least at the 5% level. This result supports the "common sense" theoreti-
cal approach to managerial succession, according to which, managerial turnover is an opportunity to improve the 
managerial team capabilities and therefore, the expected firm's outcomes. 
 
 In the sub sample composed by outside successors we observe positive and statistically significant reactions 
in all the considered windows around the event's day. In the sub sample of inside successors the market's reaction is 
not significant in any event window round the event's day. When compared to the outsiders sub sample, we observe 
more positive reactions in this one, evidencing that the market considers that outside succession events do affect po-
sitively the investor's cash flow expectations while an inside succession does not have any significant effect. Finally 
the underperforming (ADJPERF<0) and over performing sub samples (ADJPERF>0) offer results quite similar to 
the outsiders' and insiders' sub sample, showing statistically significant reactions when a firm is underperforming the 
market, but not when its performance is higher than the market's one. This suggests that a succession event results 
significant when there is a need to correct non value enhancing managerial actions. 
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Table 3: CAR around CEO's or president's turnover announcement. 
Interval Total Outsiders Insiders ADJPERF<0 ADJPERF>0 
0 0,0058** 
(2,8041) 
0,0095* 
(2,0036) 
0,0023 
(1,9635) 
0,0048** 
(3,2921) 
0,0072 
(0,4178) 
(-1;0) 0,0074 
(1,7983) 
0,0164* 
(2,1594) 
-0,0009 
(0,4172) 
0,0064* 
(2,5669) 
0,0088 
(-0,2835) 
(0;+1) 0,007* 
(2,1296) 
0,0121* 
(2,04) 
0,0022 
(0,992) 
0,0088* 
(2,4051) 
0,0043 
(0,4325) 
(-1;+1) 0,0086 
(1,5882) 
0,0189* 
(2,2721) 
-0,001 
(0,017) 
0,0104* 
(2,1589) 
0,0059 
(-0,1196) 
*,** Statistically significant at 5% and 1% level. Z values in parenthesis  
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of market reaction to managerial turnover (Unadjusted performance) 
OLS estimates. Dependent variable: (CAR01) 
Preturnover unadjusted firm's market performance (PERF) 
 REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 REG5 REG6 REG7 REG8 
PERF -0,0115 
(0,0164) 
-0,0113 
(0,0172) 
-0,041 
(0,009) 
-0,042 
(0,007) 
-0,012 
(0,038) 
-0,011 
(0,056) 
-0,043 
(0,008) 
-0,042 
(0,007) 
POUT 0,000 
(0,9211) 
0.000 
(0,9989) 
  0,000 
(0,746) 
0,000 
(0,958) 
  
DOUT   0,000 
(0,98) 
-0,001 
(0,839) 
  -0,003 
(0,66) 
-0,002 
(0,708) 
DMIX   0,01 
(0,371) 
0,006 
(0,564) 
  0,007 
(0,531) 
0,004 
(0,689) 
PERF*DOU
T 
  0,033 
(0,043) 
0,034 
(0,032) 
  0,034 
(0,039) 
0,035 
(0,031) 
PERF*DMI
X 
  0,037 
(0,215) 
0,031 
(0,301) 
  0,036 
(0,234) 
0,031 
(0,305) 
PINS -0,0016 
(0,0489) 
-0,0017 
(0,0407) 
-0,002 
(0,055) 
-0,002 
(0,052) 
-0,002 
(0,039) 
-0,002 
(0,034) 
-0,002 
(0,044) 
-0,002 
(0,044) 
LARGE3 0,0001 
(0,2071) 
 0,000 
(0,564) 
 0,000 
(0,359) 
 0,000 
(0,758) 
 
BANK  0.000 
(0,9539) 
 0,000 
(0,778) 
 0,000 
(0,967) 
 0,000 
(0,842) 
FUNDS  0,0008 
(0,0124) 
 0,001 
(0,018) 
 0,001 
(0,022) 
 0,001 
(0,032) 
NOFIN  0,0001 
(0,4108) 
 0,000 
(0,621) 
 0,000 
(0,649) 
 0,000 
(0,836) 
COUPLED 0,0078 
(0,1805) 
0,0096 
(0,0955) 
0,008 
(0,191) 
0,009 
(0,114) 
    
OUT/POOR     0,014 
(0,057) 
0,015 
(0,045) 
0,014 
(0,059) 
0,015 
(0,051) 
OUT/GOO
D 
    0,008 
(0,4) 
0,005 
(0,637) 
0,011 
(0,258) 
0,007 
(0,493) 
INS/POOR     0,005 
(0,558) 
0,006 
(0,551) 
0,007 
(0,414) 
0,007 
(0,458) 
         
F 3.49 
(0,0116) 
3.24 
(0.0059) 
2.75 
(0.0125) 
2.81 
(0,0056) 
2.60 
(0,0222) 
2.59 
(0.0131) 
2.36 
(0.0185) 
2.41 
(0.0109) 
R2 8.40% 11.36% 10.31% 13.43% 8.35% 10.79% 10.47% 12.89% 
P values in parenthesis 
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CAR01 Cumulated daily abnormal in the (0,+1) window 
PERF Firm's market performance in the window (-385,-21) 
POUT Proportion of Board's outsiders 
DOUT =1 if the proportion of Board's outsiders is higher than 60%. 0 otherwise 
DMIX =1 if the proportion of Board's outsiders is between 40% and 60%. 0 otherwise 
INOWN Stock ownership of the Board's insiders 
LARGE3 Joint stock ownership of the largest three non executive shareholders. 
BANK Joint stock ownership of financial institutions 
FUND Joint stock ownership of institutional shareholders 
NOFIN Joint stock ownership of non financial companies. 
COUPLED =1 if the successor's origin matches the need for organisational change in the company. Insider origin/good  
pretunrover performance and outsider origin/poor preturnover performance. 0 otherwise 
OUT/POOR = 1 if the successor is an outsidervi and the company underperformed the market in the year period previous to 
managerial turnover and zero otherwise 
OUT/GOOD = 1 if the successor is an outsider and the company outperformed the market in the year period previous to  
managerial turnover. = 0 otherwise 
INS/POOR = 1 if the successor is an insider and the company underperformed the market in the year period previous to ma-
nagerial turnover.  = 0 otherwise 
 
 Tables 4 and 5 display the results about the determinants of the market's reaction to managerial turnover 
events. We observe a negative and statistically significant relationship between the firm's preturnover performance 
and the market's reaction to a managerial turnover event. This result supports our first hypothesis and suggests that 
that the managerial turnover decisions are most welcome when the firm's poor performance calls for major organiza-
tional changes. The negative relationship between preturnover performance and the abnormal returns around the 
managerial turnover event implies that the market considers managerial turnover as a mechanism of organizational 
adaptation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Managerial succession results especially valuable when there is a lack of 
adaptation of the firm to its environment that causes a firm's poor performance. 
 
 Contrarily to what we expected according to our outsider supervision hypothesis, we have obtained nega-
tive although not statistically significant coefficients for the variable representing the  proportion of Board's outsid-
ers (POUT). In the same way, we have obtained negative
vii
 coefficients for the dummy variable representing an out-
sider's dominance of the Board of directors (DOUT). These results are contrary to our outsider's control hypothesis, 
and therefore we cannot say that the market is more positive about managerial succession decisions taken by a 
Board dominated by outsiders. In that way, the Board outsiders do not appear to protect the shareholders’ interests in 
crucial decisions that, as in the case of managerial succession, imply a strong interest conflict between the managers 
and the shareholders. 
 
 However, we obtain positive and statistically significant coefficients for the interaction terms of the firm's 
presuccession performance and Board's composition (DOUT*PERF) and (DOUT*ADJPERF). The different sign of 
the coefficients obtained  for preturnover performance (PERF and ADJPERF) and the interaction terms 
(DOUT*PERF) and (DOUT*ADJPERF) implies that, given a certain preturnover performance, the market reaction  
results less intense when the Board is dominated by outsiders than in the case of an insider dominated Board. This 
result seems to be, once again, contrary to our expectations as the supervisory role of the Boards’ outsiders could 
suggest the existence of more intense and significant reactions in outside-dominated Boards. However, we interpret 
this finding in a different way, If an outsider dominated Board is considered by the market as a "good control" the 
market will anticipate the turnover decision when necessary. Therefore, the market reaction to managerial succes-
sion will result stronger in insider dominated Boards, where the market does not anticipate that a necessary change is 
going to occur. In this way, a less intense reaction in outsider dominated Boards are coherent with a scenario in 
which the outsiders are playing a monitoring role and the market knows it. 
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Table 5: Determinants of market reaction to managerial turnover (adjusted performance) 
OLS estimates. Dependent variable: (CAR01). 
Preturnover firm's market performance adjusted for de market index performance (ADJPERF). 
 REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 REG5 REG6 REG7 REG8 
ADJPERF -0,0125 
(0,021) 
-0,0132 
(0,0133) 
-0,064 
(0,002) 
-0,065 
(0,002) 
-0,012 
(0,056) 
-0,012 
(0,047) 
-0,065 
(0,003) 
-0,065 
(0,002) 
POUT 0.0000 
(0,9425) 
0.0000 
(0,9583) 
  0.000 
(0,82) 
0.000 
(0,984) 
  
DOUT   0,001 
(0,858) 
0.000 
(0,961) 
  -0,001 
(0,876) 
-0,001 
(0,863) 
DMIX   0,017 
(0,16) 
0,006 
(0,601) 
  0,013 
(0,274) 
0,004 
(0,768) 
ADJPERF*DOUT   0,055 
(0,011) 
0,056 
(0,008) 
  0,055 
(0,011) 
0,056 
(0,008) 
ADJPERF*DMIX   0,082 
(0,033) 
0,048 
(0,236) 
  0,077 
(0,051) 
0,044 
(0,286) 
PINS -0,0017 
(0,0408) 
-0,0017 
(0,0326) 
-0,002 
(0,012) 
-0,002 
(0,012) 
-0,002 
(0,032) 
-0,002 
(0,027) 
-0,002 
(0,009) 
-0,002 
(0,01) 
LARGE3 0,0001 
(0,2506) 
 0.000 
(0,742) 
 0.000 
(0,402) 
 0.000 
(0,921) 
 
BANK  0.0000 
(0,9964) 
 0.000 
(0,847) 
 0.000 
(0,998) 
 0.000 
(0,937) 
FUNDS  0,0009 
(0,0081) 
 0,001 
(0,019) 
 0,001 
(0,014) 
 0,001 
(0,027) 
NOFIN  0,0001 
(0,5081) 
 0.000 
(0,854) 
 0.000 
(0,739) 
 0.000 
(0,928) 
COUPLED 0,0074 
(0,2073) 
0,0092 
(0,1088) 
0,007 
(0,188) 
0,009 
(0,123) 
    
OUT/POOR     0,014 
(0,073) 
0,014 
(0,056) 
0,013 
(0,074) 
0,014 
(0,062) 
OUT/GOOD     0,006 
(0,492) 
0,004 
(0,688) 
0,009 
(0,372) 
0,007 
(0,458) 
INS/POOR     0,004 
(0,656) 
0,005 
(0,583) 
0,006 
(0,468) 
0,007 
(0,412) 
F 3.29 
(0.0141) 
3.33 
(0.0049) 
3.23 
(0.0040) 
3.22 
(0.0018) 
2,47 
(0,0285) 
2.63 
(0.0118) 
2.68 
(0.0080) 
2.73 
(0.0042) 
R2 8.01% 11,76% 12.93% 15.99% 7.76% 11.05% 12.59% 15.33% 
P values in parenthesis 
CAR01 Cumulated daily abnormal in the (0,+1) window 
ADJPERF Firm's market performance in the window (-385,-21) adjusted for the market's index performance 
POUT Proportion of Board's outsiders 
DOUT =1 if the proportion of Board's outsiders is higher than 60%. 0 otherwise 
DMIX =1 if the proportion of Board's outsiders is between 40% and 60%. 0 otherwise 
INOWN Stock ownership of the Board's insiders 
LARGE3 Joint stock ownership of the largest three non executive shareholders. 
BANK Joint stock ownership of financial institutions 
FUND Joint stock ownership of institutional shareholders 
NOFIN Joint stock ownership of non financial companies. 
COUPLED =1 if the successor's origin matches the need for organisational change in the company. Insider origin/good pretunrover per-
formance and outsider origin/poor preturnover performance. 0 otherwise 
OUT/POOR = 1 if the successor is an outsiderviii and the company underperformed the market in the year period previous to managerial 
turnover and zero otherwise 
OUT/GOOD = 1 if the successor is an outsider and the company outperformed the market in the year period previous to managerial turno-
ver. = 0 otherwise 
INS/POOR = 1 if the successor is an insider and the company underperformed the market in the year period previous to managerial turno-
ver.  = 0 otherwise 
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 We have obtained negative and statistically significant coefficients in all regressions for the insider's stock 
ownership (INOWN). This result support our entrenchment hypothesis, according to which, managerial stock own-
ership isolates the managers from external controls, and therefore, provides the managerial team with discretion to 
incur in non value enhancing actions. In any managerial succession process, when the managerial team controls a 
significant amount of votes, they may impose their own interests regarding their professional careers, instead of 
promoting the most suitable candidate for the vacant, independently of her/his origin. Thus, the higher the insider's 
stock ownership, the less favorable investors are about managerial succession decisions. 
 
 Regarding the monitoring role of the large shareholders, we have obtained positive
ix
, but not statistically 
significant coefficients for our ownership concentration variable (LARGE3)
x
. This result does not support our large 
shareholders’ supervision hypothesis. However, when the nature of the large shareholders is considered, we obtain a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the stock ownership of the institutional investors and the 
market's reaction to managerial turnover. This result suggests that the market is sensitive to the possible existence of 
particular interests of large shareholders that in the case of financial institutions and non financial companies could 
be contrary to the general interest of the small shareholders. However, in the case of institutional investors, which 
represent a certain mass of small shareholders, it seems that there is not such a conflict of interests, and therefore, 
the market trusts their supervisory action. 
 
 Finally, in reference to the combined effect of successor's origin and preturnover performance, we have 
found evidences that partially support our hypothesis. We have obtained positive, but non statistically significant 
coefficients in all the regressions for the variable (COUPLED), that represented those managerial turnover decisions 
in which the successor was an outsider in a poor performing company or an insider in a good performing company. 
In those cases, we assumed that there was a good adaptation between the successor's propensity to promote major 
organizational changes and the need for these changes. We cannot affirm the existence of differences in the market 
reaction depending on this classification scheme of the turnover events. However, when we consider dummy va-
riables that establish four categories depending on preturnover performance and successor's origin, we obtained pos-
itive and statistically significant coefficients for the dummy representing an outsider successor in underperforming 
companies. This results suggest that the impact of a succession event is more intense when the successor is expected 
to undertake major organizational changes, and at the same time, when poor performance calls for those changes. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 Managerial succession constitutes a crucial event for the company. On the one hand it can generate impor-
tant organizational changes that will affect the shareholders’ wealth. On the other hand, it is a decision that entails 
important conflicts of interests between the managers and the shareholders, as the manager's professional careers can 
result clearly damaged by an incoming outsider, while the shareholders’ interests could be best served by this kind 
of successor. Studying the market reactions around managerial succession events, allow us to check firstly whether 
changing a firm's leader has an impact on the shareholders wealth, and secondly, to analyze if the control mechan-
isms that form the corporate governance system, act in the shareholders’ best interest in the presence of a strong in-
terest conflict. 
 
 Our study conducted in the Spanish market and based on a sample of top executive turnover announce-
ments in the period 1990-97 evidence the relevance of the managerial turnover decisions for the shareholders’ 
wealth. We have observed positive and statistically significant market reactions around the managerial turnover an-
nouncement. This reactions results particularly intense in the case of an incoming outside manager and when the 
company preturnover performance was poor. This evidence, according to other studies in the US market, suggests 
that managerial turnover is an opportunity to adapt the firm's strategies to a changing environment, correcting pre-
vious managerial actions that did not create value for the shareholders. 
 
 We have obtained evidence of a negative relationship between the firm's preturnover performance and the 
firms market reaction to managerial turnover. This finding suggests that managerial turnover is most welcomed 
when there is a more intense need of changes in the firm's strategies. This, once again, reveals that managerial turn-
over is a valuable restructuring measure that can affect the firm's future outcomes. 
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 Regarding the effect of the corporate governance structure, we have obtained evidences that suggest that the 
Board's outsiders and the institutional investors, play a major role controlling managerial deviations from value en-
hancing behavior. We have obtained also evidences of the existence of entrenchment effects linked to managerial 
stock ownership. 
 
 Our conclusions about the Spanish governance system, mainly suggest that the shareholders’ interests are 
effectively represented by the Board of directors and institutional investors. Therefore, this control mechanisms 
seem to be effective enough to overcome the agency conflicts in the Spanish context characterized by a low legal 
protection of the shareholders’ rights and a low intensity of the external control exerted by the markets. 
 
 Finally, relating the relevance of the successor's origin, our results suggest that only outside succession un-
der the condition of preturnover poor performance, has a significant (and positive) effect on the market's reaction to 
managerial turnover events. These results strengthen our event study results and suggest that managerial turnover 
has significant effects on the firm's future performance when the successor is an outsider and the company needs a 
correction of its strategies. This result agrees with the view of managerial inside succession as an event that pro-
motes stability, and therefore, has no effects on the firm's future outcomes, while outside succession promotes a re-
organization of the firm that can produce significant effects on the shareholders’ wealth.    
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Endnotes 
                                                          
i These authors found a positive relationship between the market abnormal return for the shareholders of the acquirer firm and the manager's stock 
ownership in that firm. 
ii See Dan and DeAngelo, (1988) and (1983) , Bradley and Wakeman, (1983) for a detailed study of the shareholders’ wealth losses caused by 
managerial resistance to takeover attempts. 
iii We considered the successor an outsider if previously to his/her appointment as manager He/she was not an employee of the company. 
iv In order not to omit in the classification of insiders those directors which abandoned their managerial job before 1990, but continued as direc-
tors after this date, we have consulted the firm's and manager's directories from 1981 to 1997. 
v Only 29% of the turnover announcements in this sample were defined as "retirement" or "departing for another job" 
vi We considered the successor an outsider if previously to his/her appointment as manager He/she was not an employee of the company. 
vii Although the reported coefficients of (POUT) and some reported for (DOUT) are equal to zero, this happens because these coefficients that are 
negative, but extremely close to zero, have been rounded to the third decimal.  
viii We considered the successor an outsider if previously to his/her appointment as manager He/she was not an employee of the company. 
ix Although the reported coefficients for (LARGE3), (BANK) and some reported for (NOFIN) are equal to zero, this happens because these coef-
ficient that are positive but extremely close to zero, have been rounded to the third decimal.  
x The results were similar when we use the stock ownership of the largest or the five largest non executive shareholders. 
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